Is There Price Fixing in the U.S. Broiler Chicken Industry?

In 2016, U.S. buyers of broiler chickens (“broilers”) filed private antitrust lawsuits against the largest broiler processors in the country. The plaintiffs alleged that these processors engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to limit broiler production with the purpose of fixing, increasing, and stabilizing wholesale and retail prices of broilers as early as January 2008, violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act (1890). This article examines competition (business conduct) issues revealed during the ongoing Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation.

Table 1. The Ten Largest Companies in the
U.S. Broiler Chicken Industry and Their
Market Shares, 2024
 

Note: Broiler production is the broiler ready-to-cook weight.
Market shares are calculated by the author. Values in
parentheses are cumulative market shares.
Source: WATTPoultry USA (2025).

U.S. Broiler Industry: Structure, Organization, and Production Contracts

The U.S. broiler industry is concentrated, meaning that several large processors control large shares of broiler production and sales in the country. As of 2024, Tyson Foods, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Wayne-Sanderson Farms were the three largest processors, with market shares of 21.3%, 15.8%, and 14.4%, respectively, in national broiler production volume (Table 1). They were followed by a group of smaller processors with market shares in the range of 2.7%–6.5%. The ten largest processors had a combined market share of almost 83%.

The industry is also vertically integrated, meaning that processors (integrators) maintain ownership of broiler birds at all stages of the broiler supply chain through sale of the final products. Broiler processors also typically own the feed mills, hatcheries, and processing plants used in chicken production (USITC, 2014; National Chicken Council, 2025). Production contracts with independent growers are predominantly used to facilitate the live production (grow-out) of broilers. Consequently, processors make production, marketing, and pricing decisions, including decisions on broiler quantities produced by growers under these contracts. In addition to providing chicks, feed, veterinary supplies and services, and transportation of chickens to and from the farms, processors also determine production management practices (MacDonald, 2008). Growers are then responsible for providing and paying for chicken housing facilities, land, labor, utilities, farm operating expenses, and following production management practices determined by processors.

Figure 1. U.S. Broiler Industry: Monthly
Feed Costs Index, Wholesale Price Index,
and Wholesale Price Minus Feed Costs
Index, 2001–2017
 

Source: USDA-ERS (2022a).

Production Cuts and Alleged Broiler Price-Fixing Cartel

A dramatic increase in feed prices, coupled with the effects of broiler supply and price developments, adversely affected broiler processors’ profitability between 2006 and 2012 (USITC, 2014). There was a consistent increase in broiler quantity produced, which the market could not absorb at prices profitable for processors (In Re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation [BCAL], 2016). First, these processors are affected by broiler production and price cycle. For example, processors increased broiler production in response to high broiler prices between 2006 and 2008 (USITC, 2014). Second, to increase their market shares, some of the processors aimed to increase broiler production (In Re BCAL, 2016).

The feed costs represent approximately 65%–75% of broiler production costs (USITC, 2014). The prices of corn and soybean meal, the two major feed components used in broiler production, began increasing in 2006 and reached a dramatically high level between 2008 and 2012, partially contributing to the oversupply of broilers (USITC, 2014). At the same time, broiler demand was declining due to the 2008–2009 economic recession (USITC, 2014). Figure 1 depicts changes in the feed cost and wholesale broiler price indices between 2001 and 2017, indicating that the feed cost index level was much higher than the wholesale price index level between 2008 and 2014, which may reflect profitability issues in the industry during this period.

Beginning in 2008, the largest processors implemented production cuts at various stages of the broiler supply chain. Some of these processors made public statements regarding the oversupply problem adversely affecting their profitability and their intent to implement production cuts. The following excerpts provide two examples:

1. In response, Pilgrim’s issued a call to action for its competitors to reduce their production of Broilers to allow prices to recover. On a January 29, 2008, earnings call, Pilgrim’s CFO … said the industry was oversupplying Broilers and it was hurting market prices. [CFO] explained that his company had done its part in 2007 by reducing production 5%, so “the rest [] of the market is going to have to pick-up a fair share in order for the production to come out of the system. (In Re BCAL, 2016, para. 147, emphasis original)
2. On April 3, 2008, Fieldale Farms announced a 5% production cut. In connection with the cut, Executive Vice President … commented that Fieldale has had trouble passing on cost increases to both foodservice and retail customers. “Every time we try [to increase prices], one of our competitors comes in with a price lower than our previous price,” …... Fieldale, which has been absorbing feed-cost increases, hopes its move will help ease continuing price pressure. “We can’t sell [some of] the chickens at a price higher than the cost,” …. “We’re hoping this cut puts supply and demand back into better balance.” (In Re BCAL, 2016, para. 151, emphasis original)

In 2016, buyers of broilers at the wholesale and retail levels filed class action antitrust lawsuits against the largest processors, alleging that they engaged in an unlawful price-fixing conspiracy as early as January 2008. In their complaints filed in the court, the buyers (plaintiffs) stated that the defendants implemented a series of allegedly anticompetitive and coordinated production cuts to decrease the quantities of broilers produced to increase wholesale and retail broiler prices above competitive levels. The combined market share of the largest processors who implemented production cuts was approximately 90% (In Re BCAL, 2016, para. 2). The following bullet points outline the original allegations made by the plaintiffs (In Re BCAL, 2016, para. 140):

• At the breeder stage, the processors decreased the size of breeder flocks and the size of egg sets by breaking eggs and selling them to rendering plants.
• At the hatching stage, the processors destroyed newly hatched chicks before delivering them to broiler growers.
• At the grow-out (farm) stage, the processors decreased the number of young chicks delivered to contract growers and increased the period between picking up mature chickens from the growers and delivering young chicks to the growers.
• At the processing stage, the processors decreased the size (weight) of broilers at slaughter by slaughtering them before they reached mature age. In addition, they slowed down or closed (temporary or permanently) some of their processing plants.
• The processors increased export of chicks and broilers, which decreased their quantities available for domestic market

The plaintiffs alleged that the largest broiler processors engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy (cartel) by publicly communicating their intentions to implement production cuts and by sharing private, competitor-sensitive information (In Re BCAL, 2016). The information exchanges were allegedly accomplished by partnering with Agri Stats, a third-party data aggregation service, which collected and processed confidential production and financial data from broiler processors, then shared these anonymous data back with these processors.

The plaintiffs claimed that the alleged broiler price-fixing cartel was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (1890), which prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade in interstate commerce. Price-fixing agreements (cartels or conspiracies) are examples of the restraints of trade that are most damaging to the market. Price-fixing agreements aim to increase, decrease, or fix (stabilize) product prices and can be verbal, written, or inferred from the conduct of firms (Federal Trade Commission, 2025).

The market effects of a typical output price-fixing cartel are a decrease in the product quantity available in the market, an increase in the product price buyers pay, a welfare transfer from buyers to producers (overcharge), and a deadweight loss, due to which there are buyers who do not purchase the product because of higherprices (Bolotova, 2022). The overcharge is the basis for damages that plaintiffs aim to recover during antitrust litigations.

The lawsuits filed by broiler buyers are private lawsuits. The buyers who purchased broilers directly from the processors (for example, food retailers and wholesalers) are entitled to recover treble damages (three times the overcharge) under the Clayton Act (1914). Buyers who purchased broilers indirectly from the processors (for example, final consumers) are entitled to recover damages in selected states with antitrust or similar laws that allow indirect buyers to recover damages due to antitrust violations.

As of March 2025, the following settlements have been reached. The lawsuit with direct purchasers was settled for a total amount of $284,651,750 (Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation (Direct Purchaser) web page, 2025). Selected defendants settled the lawsuit with indirect purchasers, who purchased broilers for final consumption, for $181,000,000 (Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation (End-User Consumer) web page, 2025). Selected defendants settled the lawsuit with indirect purchasers, who are commercial and institutional buyers, for $103,890,000 (Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation (Commercial) web page, 2025). In their settlement agreements, the processors-defendants do not admit to any wrongdoing.

In June 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened its own criminal investigation of price fixing, bid rigging 

and other anticompetitive conduct in the broiler industry. The potential maximum statutory penalties for violating the Sherman Act in criminal cases are a $100,000,000 fine for corporations and a $1,000,000 fine and up to 10 years in jail for individuals (U.S. Department of Justice, 2025). The maximum fine may be increased to twice the gain from the crime for violators or twice the loss incurred by the victims, if this amount is higher than the statutory maximum fine.

In 2020, several executives and employees of the largest broiler processors were indicted on price-fixing and bid-rigging charges for conspiring to suppress and eliminate competition for broiler sales (U.S. Department of Justice, 2025). These individuals were alleged to be involved in exchanging price information for broilers using text messages, emails, and phone calls. In 2022, a grand jury acquitted these individuals (U.S. Department of Justice, 2025).

As a result of the DOJ criminal investigation, one of the largest broiler processors, Pilgrim’s Pride (owned by JBS S.A.), pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of approximately $107 million for participating in a nation-wide conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for broiler chicken products (U.S. Department of Justice, 2025).

Figure 2. U.S. Broiler Production and
Wholesale Prices (Yearly Data), 2000–2015
 

Note: Yearly prices are
calculated by the author using monthly prices reported in
USDA-ERS, 2022a.
Source: USDA-ERS (2022a,b).

Broiler Production, Export, Availability, and Prices

Figure 2 depicts yearly broiler production and wholesale broiler prices for the pre-production control (pre-PC) period (2000–2007) and the production control (PC) period (2008–2015).. An analysis of yearly changes in broiler production indicates a consistent increase in production in the pre-PC period, which might have contributed to the oversupply problem. In the PC period, decreases in broiler production were observed in two years: -3.78% in 2009 and -0.44% in 2012.

The following changes in the industry dynamics in the PC period, as compared with the pre-PC period, are reported in the literature (Bolotova, 2022). Yearly average broiler production increased by 12% (33,127 million lb to 37,100 million lb). While production cuts on average did not decrease broiler production in the PC period overall, they might have decreased production growth rate. The yearly average exports increased by 35% (5,162 million lb to 6,970 million lb). Despite an increase in exports, broiler quantity available for domestic consumption increased in the PC period by 7.8% (27,833 million lb to 30,016 million lb). The yearly average broiler quantity available per capita increased by 1% (95 lb to 96 lb). 

The monthly average wholesale broiler price increased by 23% ($0.64/lb to $0.79/lb). This price increase is likely to reflect the increasing feed (corn and soybean meal) prices that the processors had to pay in the PC period. While the monthly average feed costs index increased by 66% (110 to 183) in the PC period, the monthly average wholesale price index increased by 20% (115 to 138) (Figure 1).

Business and Policy Implications

The economic rationale for implementing production cuts exists. According to microeconomic theory, if the industry faces increasing costs, the industry will decrease the output quantity produced to pass the cost increase on the buyers of their output in the form of higher output prices (Bolotova, 2022). To pass the feed cost increases on broiler buyers, the processors had to decrease broiler production. Had the processors not implemented production cuts, they would have oversupplied broilers, received prices below production costs, and incurred financial losses. This would have further worsened the broiler oversupply problem the industry already faced by 2008 (USITC, 2014).

The fact that these production cuts were coordinated created a legal issue. First, some of the processors publicly announced their intentions to implement production cuts (In Re BCAL, 2016). For example, Tyson Foods and Pilgrim’s Pride discussed industry developments, costs, production plans, and profitability during their public earnings calls. Second, the processors partnered with Agri Stats to allegedly enforce their cartel agreement by monitoring each other’s production and pricing and discipline cartel members for not complying with their agreement (In Re BCAL, 2016).

In September 2023, the DOJ filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Agri Stats, alleging that its data-sharing service provided to broiler chicken, turkey, and pork processors was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (U.S. Department of Justice v. Agri Stats, 2023). The largest meat processors are named as co-conspirators in the complaint. The DOJ requests the court to rule that Agri Stats’s and its broiler, turkey, and pork co-conspirators’ anticompetitive information exchanges have unreasonably restrained trade and are unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the DOJ requests the court to permanently enjoin Agri Stats to cease facilitating exchanges of sensitive information and discontinue engaging in the anticompetitive practices described in the complaint.

The outcomes of the DOJ action will help clarify legal boundaries for certain types of information exchanges among meat processors. However, the processors’ conduct involving the manner and extent to which they communicate competitively sensitive information, including production plans, during public earnings calls, industry meetings, and other venues will face legal uncertainty. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission states that sharing information on output, costs, prices, customers, or strategic planning may represent competition concerns (Bloom, 2014). Exchanges of competitively sensitive information may be used as a plus factor when the presence of price-fixing agreements violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act is to be inferred from the firms’ conduct during antitrust litigations.

Concerns about a high level of concentration in the broiler industry and the largest processors’ ability to exercise seller market power, potentially leading to higher broiler prices, are likely to remain in the future. The 2022 merger between Sanderson Farms and Wayne Farms increased the market share of the third-largest processor and the combined market share of the four largest processors (Kelloway, 2022). The current industry structure may be characterized as a three-firm oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The Sanderson-Wayne merger is a structural change that is likely to affect interdependent conduct of the three largest processors and the conduct of a group of smaller processors. This group of smaller processors may act as a competitive fringe by charging broiler prices that are lower than the prices charged by the largest processors, which would lead to overall lower market prices. Alternatively, smaller processors may follow the conduct of the largest firms-leaders by charging similar prices, which would lead to overall higher market prices.

The industry structure and competition issues highlight the need to consider establishing a broiler chicken mandatory price reporting program similar to the livestock mandatory price reporting program. The latter is expected to improve the information flow and price discovery process in the markets for livestock and livestock products, ultimately leading to enhanced competition (Greene, 2019). The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act (1999) requires beef, pork, and lamb processors to report prices, quantities, and other transaction-specific information related to the purchases of live animals and sales of meat products to the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS), which is responsible for enforcing the act. This information is processed and posted for public access on the USDA-AMS web page. The vertically integrated nature of the broiler industry should be considered to determine the type of information to be collected from broiler processors.

To inform future policy directions and provide information relevant to market monitoring efforts, the following research directions are suggested. The first is to analyze the broiler industry dynamics during the post-antitrust litigation period by focusing on changes in production, costs, prices, and profitability relative to the alleged cartel period. The second is to evaluate the designs of price systems that broiler processors use in their sale/purchase contracts with wholesalers, retailers, and food services. During the alleged cartel period, some of the processors shifted from fixed price contracts to contracts using a variety of pricing methods (for example, they started tying contract prices to publicly available price indices) (In Re BCAL, 2016). The contract price mechanisms may be used by firms with market power to coordinate their pricing strategies. The third is to apply price screens for collusion to data available from USDA-AMS. The screens for collusion—particularly price variance screens—have been discussed in academic literature and applied in a variety of industry settings (Bolotova, Connor, and Miller, 2008; Abrantes-Metz and Bajari, 2009).

While this article focuses on competition issues involving seller market power of the largest broiler processors, there are also competition issues involving their buyer market power, (which are outside the scope of this article and include allegedly illegal fixing and suppression of the compensations paid to broiler growers and wages paid to processing plant workers) as well as transparency and fairness of the growers’ compensation system and other terms included in broiler production contracts (U.S. Department of Justice, 2022; Bolotova, 2025; USDA-AMS, 2025).

For More Information 

Abrantes-Metz, R.M., and P. Bajari. 2009. “Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple Applications.” Antitrust Magazine 24(1):66–71.

Bloom, M. 2014, December 11. “Information Exchange: Be Reasonable.” Competition Matters [blog]. Federal Trade Commission. Available online: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2014/12/information-exchange-be-reasonable

Bolotova, Y.V. 2022. “Price-Fixing in the U.S. Broiler Chicken and Pork Industries.” Applied Economics Teaching Resources 4(4): 55-91. https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.324808

———. 2025. “Buyer Market Power in the U.S. Broiler Chicken Industry.” Applied Economics Teaching Resources. Forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.71162/aetr.575566

Bolotova, Y.V., J.M. Connor, and D.J. Miller. 2008. “The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 26:1290–1307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.12.008

Federal Trade Commission. 2025. Price Fixing. Available online: https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing

Greene, J.L. 2019. Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act: Overview for Reauthorization in the 116th Congress. Congressional Research Service Report R45777.

Kelloway, K. 2022, August 4. “DOJ Settlement with Cargill and Sanderson Has Big Implications for Chicken Farmers and Workers.” Food & Power. Available online: https://www.foodandpower.net/latest/cargill-sanderson-consent-decree-8-2022

MacDonald, J.M. 2008. The Economic Organization of U.S. Broiler Production. USDA Economic Research Service Economic Information Bulletin EIB-38.

National Chicken Council. 2025. Vertical Integration. Available online: https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/industry-issues/vertical-integration/

U.S. Department of Agriculture Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS). 2025. Transparency in Poultry Grower Contracting and Tournaments. https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/transparency-poultry-grower-contracting-and-tournaments

U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS). 2022a. Livestock & Meat Domestic Data. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/livestock-meat-domestic-data/livestock-meat-domestic-data

———. 2022b. Food Availability (Per Capita) Data System. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-availability-per-capita-data-system/food-availability-per-capita-data-system/#Food%20Availability

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs. 2022, July 25. “Justice Department Files Lawsuit and Proposed Consent Decrees to End Long-Running Conspiracy to Suppress Worker Pay at Poultry Processing Plants and Address Deceptive Abuses against Poultry Growers” [press release]. Available online: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-files-lawsuit-and-proposed-consent-decrees-end-long-running-conspiracy

———. 2025, February 6. “Four Executives and Company Charged with Price Fixing in Ongoing Investigation into Broiler Chicken Industry” [press release]. Originally published on July 29, 2021. Available online: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/four-executives-and-company-charged-price-fixing-ongoing-investigation-broiler-chicken

U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 2014. Poultry: Industry & Trade Summary. Office of Industries Publication ITS-010.

WATTPoultry USA. 2025, March/April. “Top Broiler Companies, Million Lbs. RTC“ on page 23. Available online: https://www.wattagnet.com/magazine

Court documents and relevant web pages

Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation (Direct Purchaser) web page. 2025. Available online: https://www.broilerchickenantitrustlitigation.com/

Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation (End-User Consumer) web page. 2025. Available online: https://www.overchargedforchicken.com/

Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation (Commercial) web page. 2025. Available online: https://www.chickencommercialsettlement.com/

In Re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation [In Re BCAL]. Case: 1:16-cv-08637. Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Second Amended and Consolidated Class Action Complaint Dated 11/23/16. Available online: https://www.broilerchickenantitrustlitigation.com/docs/Fieldale/5.pdf

U.S. Department of Justice v. Agri Stats. 2023. Complaint filed 09/28/23. Available online: https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/1316576/dl?inline