CHOICES
A publication of AAEA
The United States is the largest agricultural exporting country (on an individual country basis), with over $170 billion in exports annually since 2021. While the United States’s top three destination markets—Mexico, Canada, and China—accounted for $84.12 billion, or nearly half (48%) of total US exports in 2024, other regions such as East Asia (Japan and South Korea), South and Southeast Asia, Latin America and Europe imported 52% of US food and agricultural exports worth $92.3 billion (USDA-FAS, 2025a).
On April 2, 2025, the United States unveiled a new approach to rebalance global trade, introducing new supplemental tariffs on imports from nearly all trading partners. A universal 10% tariff applied to imports beginning April 9, 2025, with higher rates targeting nations with persistent US trade deficits. After several delays, the tariffs entered into force on August 7, 2025. Subsequently, the US Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that the tariffs exceeded the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and on August 29, 2025, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s ruling but stayed the decision until October 14, 2025, to allow time for further appeal. The Supreme Court of the United States is now hearing the case involving broad tariffs that contribute to large and persistent goods trade deficits imposed under IEEPA.
Separately, two-way tariffs between the United States and China briefly exceeded 125% in April 2025 before being adjusted and paused. During this period, the United States maintained a 10% baseline along with a 20% tariff in response to China’s role in supplying precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl, resultingin an effective tariff rate of 30%. China retaliated with10%–15% tariffs related to US fentanyl actions and a 10% baseline tariff, for an effective supplemental tariff of 20%–25% on its imports from the United States. While China’s retaliatory tariffs may seem low compared to the over 100% tariffs the two countries exchanged in April 2025, they are roughly equal to the retaliatory duties China imposed during the 2018/19 trade dispute in which US agricultural exports to China fell 53%, or $10.3 billion, in 2018 compared to 2017 (Carter and Steinbach, 2020; Grant and Sydow, 2020; Grant et al., 2020; Adjemian, Smith, and He, 2021; Grant et al., 2021). An important recent development is that China has not booked any new US soybeans as of late August 2025. This is a significant departure from historical patterns (Arita et al., 2025b): By the end of August in 2022, 2023, and 2024, US exporters had booked 4.9 million metric tons (MMT), 6.3 MMT, and 12.7 MMT, respectively, of new crop soybean exports to China, a notable year-over-year decrease.
Soybeans have received considerable media attention as the largest US agricultural export by value (with corn leading by volume). However, as discussed later, exports of several other agricultural products to China have also declined in 2025. A tentative agreement between the US and China in early November 2025 aimed to ease some tariffs and resume agricultural trade, but data through September 2025 indicate that agriculture has again been caught in the crossfire of US-China trade relations (Arita et al., 2025b).
Despite these challenges, US trade negotiators have simultaneously pursued an aggressive strategy of bilateral engagement with other key markets. This dual approach—maintaining pressure on China while expanding into other markets—has yielded a series of framework agreements that could help diversify US agricultural exports.
This article reviews current bilateral trade negotiations for agriculture, including announced trade deals and preliminary trade projections summarized by various media outlets, and summarizes the height of agricultural most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs in these regions and potential tariff offers being proposed. We conclude by evaluating the trade complementarity index (TCI) between the United States and bilateral trade agreement countries. The TCI provides insight into how well these regional trading partners’ import shares across products align with US export shares and comparative advantage in the same product categories.
Although specific details continue to be negotiated, the more aggressive US approach to trade negotiations has resulted in several announcements of bilateral trade frameworks. Table 1 reviews these announcements and highlights select trade potential for increased US agricultural exports. Admittedly, the details of these framework announcements are scarce as of this writing, and we lack sufficient information across all product categories to provide a more comprehensive assessment. Thus, our projections are somewhat speculative and only touch key agricultural products that have been summarized by the media or White House Factsheets or mentioned in the media by US or foreign trade officials.
Source: Authors’ interpretation and tabulations from Thukral
(2025), Paul (2025), Hanrahan (2025), Reuters (2025), and
other media and White House Fact Sheets, including
https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-
president-donald-j-trump-secures-unprecedented-u-s-japan-
strategic-trade-and-investment-agreement/,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/07/joint-
statement-on-framework-for-united-states-indonesia-
agreement-on-reciprocal-trade/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-the-
united-states-and-indonesia-reach-historic-trade-deal/
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-
states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-
and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500738/pdf/
DCPD-202500738.pdf
aMalaysia and Cambodia trade deals are not included in
Southeast Asia above. The specific details so far indicate
commitments to nonagricultural products such as aircraft,
coal, and telecommunications.
bJapan’s farm product imports from current levels include
soybeans, corn, wheat, coarse grains, rice, DDGs, ethanol,
beef, pork, and poultry. Historically, these products totaled
around $7 billion worth of imports from the United States.
We base our information solely on public announcements and summaries as scrutinized by the authors and compared to historical bilateral trade levels. In many cases, these announcements include volume-based pledges, such as a commitment to import 750,000 metric tons of US wheat. To estimate the potential trade value, we convert volume figures into dollars using average monthly free-on-board (FOB) unit prices from 2025. While prices can and will fluctuate in future marketing years based on global supply and demand conditions, our trade estimates are based on initial reference year 2025 FOB prices. Finally, much will depend on whether these commitments are additive to current trade levels.
In 2024, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand were the 8th, 9th, 11th, and 26th largest markets for US agricultural exports, respectively, with $11.2 billion exported. In July 2025, the United States and Indonesia signed a framework agreement that included Indonesian tariff reductions on most agricultural products and biofuels. The framework includes increased imports of US wheat and overall agricultural purchases of $4.5 billion annually through 2030. Currently, total US agricultural exports to Indonesia average over $3 billion.
The Philippines is the largest Southeast Asian market for US exports, sourcing 17.3% of its total agricultural imports from the United States, particularly soybean meal. The US-Philippines framework deal mentions the potential for 3.3 MMT of corn with an estimated value of nearly $760 million using current FOB export unit value prices.
At $3.37 billion, US agricultural exports to Vietnam in 2024 are almost equal to those to the Philippines. Vietnam has announced intentions to import US corn, wheat, distiller’s dried grains (DDGs), soybean meal, and other farm products (Table 1) totaling $2 billion. Year-to-date, Vietnam’s imports of agricultural products from the United States are 37% higher than in 2024.
Thai officials have indicated the potential for importing up to 2 million metric tons (MMT) of soybeans and more than 1 MMT of corn. Soybeans, soybean meal, dairy products, and wheat are among Thailand’s largest agricultural imports, collectively accounting for nearly 32% of its total agricultural import value. Thailand imposes a very high corn tariff of 73% on its imports from nonpreferential partners, including the US, and an 80% over-quota tariff rate on soybean imports. Based on current US export unit values, converting the mentioned volume increases over existing levels suggests that the trade framework could generate approximately $1 billion in additional US agricultural exports to Thailand.
Although discussions remain ongoing, Bangladeshi officials announced a tentative trade deal with the United States on August 1, 2025. Sources indicate that Bangladesh will commit to importing 700,000 MT annually of US wheat (Paul, 2025). Current US wheat shipments to Asia are averaging $260–$300/MT. The implication is that US wheat exports to Bangladesh could increase by $200 million.
Japan is a major market for US agricultural exports. It is the second largest market for US corn, beef, and pork exports; the third largest wheat market; the fifth- or sixth-largest soybean market (depending on the year); and the seventh- and ninth-largest market for US sorghum and DDG exports, respectively (USDA-FAS, 2025a). The US-Japan framework deal is less specific on product-specific purchases, although it does mention increased imports of US rice, biofuels, and farm products. Japan imports around $7 billion of corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, coarse grains, DDGs, ethanol, beef, pork, and poultry. Scaling this to the announced $8 billion, including a 75% increase in Japanese rice imports from the United States, suggests an additional potential of $1 billion of US-Japan agricultural trade (Table 1).
The US-Taiwan framework deal has yet to be announced, but it is expected soon. Under thisagreement, media reports indicate that Taiwan couldpurchase up to $3 billion of soybeans, $2 billion in cornproducts (Indiana), and $1.2 billion of wheat (Idaho). Indiana, Ohio, and Idaho signed direct letters of intent for specific products. Given current trade levels with Taiwan in these product categories, these increases could generate an additional $760 million per year of bilateral trade.
For agriculture, the US-UK and US-EU deals are harder to pin down. The US-UK framework was the first trade deal announced in May 2025, and media coverage has focused on increased imports of two US agricultural products: ethanol and beef. In 2024, UK imports of undenatured and denatured ethyl alcohol (ethanol) from
all countries totaled nearly $1 billion. For ethanol, trade increases will be achieved through a combination of tariff elimination and a US-specific tariff-rate quota carve-out of 1.4 billion liters. The UK’s current applied tariff onethanol imports from the United States is 16 British
pounds/hectoliter (16 GBP/HL) for undenatured and 8 GBP/HL for denatured. Using a USD/GBP exchange rate of 1.34 and US export prices of $0.60/liter suggests an applied tariff of 21%–30% on an ad valoremequivalent basis. Assuming the UK will allocate all of the 1.4 billion liters of ethanol quota licenses and including the higher high-quality beef quota allotment could generate an additional $550 million in US-UK exports.
The US-EU framework is less specific on agricultural details, although the EU Commission (2025) notes that the agreement will provide preferential market access for a wide range of US seafood and agricultural goods, including tree nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foods, planting seeds, soybean oil, and pork and bison meat.
Preliminary Totals for Selected Product MentionsTo get a sense of what these agreements may hold for US agricultural exports, we can sum up the preliminary announced total trade values (column 5, Table 1) andthe potential trade change from current levels (column 6, Table 1). Publicly announced trade values total $20billion (column 5). However, some of this is likely to include current trade levels. The aggregate total of column 6 suggests that US exports increase $6.6 billion under these framework agreements; 68% of the potential trade increase is from increased trade with Indonesia (23% of column 6 total), Japan (18%), Thailand (15%), and the Philippines (12%).
While new bilateral trade agreements offer promising opportunities, these potential trade increases have to be weighed against retaliatory trade actions in other markets. China and Canada both imposed retaliatory measures in response to US trade actions. As shown in Figure 1, the value of China’s imports of US agricultural products during April–September 2025 declined significantly across nearly all major commodity categories relative to the same period in 2024. While China’s soybean imports from the US decreased by nearly $2 billion (from $4.2 billion in 2024 to $2.3 billion in 2025), its imports of cotton, grain sorghum, wheat, and corn have fallen close to zero. Until recently, China had not purchased a single new-crop US soybeanshipment through late October 2025, resulting in a record low soybean basis in September 2025 (Arita et al., 2025a). This structural shift has resulted in Brazil capturing the vast majority of China’s soybean imports, while the US share has declined substantially.
In November 2025, the United States and China reached a deal that offers partial relief to US agriculture. The centerpiece of the agreement is China’s commitment to purchase 12 million metric tons (MMT) of US soybeans through January 2026, plus a minimum of 25 MMT annually for calendar years 2026–2028, totaling 87 MMTover the commitment period. This volume-based approach represents a shift from the Phase 1 agreement’s dollar-denominated targets, improving transparency and establishing a defined export baseline that stabilizes expectations. To facilitate US-China agricultural trade, China agreed to suspend its 10% baseline and 15% additional tariffs imposed in March 2025 in response to US fentanyl-related measures, which had covered many agricultural products, including soybeans. However, the 10% baseline tariff in May 2025 remains in effect, leaving US soybean exports facing a 3% most favored nation (MFN) and 10% retaliation rate. China also committed to resume purchases of US sorghum.
While the agreement provides meaningful relief and establishes a floor for US soybean exports, historical evidence suggests that Chinese soybean purchases are closely tied to counterseasonal relative prices. China consistently buys US soybeans during the October through January period when US beans are competitively priced compared to Brazil. This raises important questions: Can China meet its annual purchase commitment during this peak export window, particularly the 12 MMT pledged between November 2025 and January 2026? Or will Chinese importers need to purchase out-of-season US soybeans at a premium? Much remains to be seen; thus, we have not included US-China trade potential in Table 1. For now, however, the new deal signals a positive step toward putting US-China agricultural trade back on track.
The projected gains for US agricultural exports will depend, to some extent, on the degree to which trading partners lower their existing tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs) (Karagulle et al., 2025). Figure 2 compares average applied MFN tariffs across bulk, intermediate, and consumer-oriented (BICO) product categories for 11 countries/regions: the United States, India, five Southeast Asian economies (Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia), Japan, Taiwan, the UK, and the international average for all WTO members. Countries/regions are plotted on the horizontal axis, while the depth axis lists the three BICO categories. The vertical axis measures the height of the current average applied MFN tariffs. All tariff data come from the World Trade Organization’s Tariff and Trade Download (TTD) system.
India and Thailand’s average tariffs are the highest at 39% and 25%, respectively. These applied tariff levels are more than 6 and 5 times the average MFN tariffs applied by the United States. Thailand’s tariff structure also varies by product category, with the highest rates imposed on consumer-related products (33%), followed by bulk (23%) and intermediate products (18%). Among Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia has the lowest average applied MFN tariffs.
Average tariff rates can obscure some product-line tariffs that are prohibitively high. For example, US soybean and corn exports to India face 45% and 50% tariffs, respectively. Thailand maintains a tariff-rate quota on soybean imports with a 20% in-quota rate and a prohibitive 80% over-quota rate. US corn exports to Thailand face a 73% tariff. By comparison, Vietnam’ssoybean tariff is 0%, and it recently reduced its soy meal tariff from 2% to 0%.
US wheat is exported in high volumes to the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. While the average MFN applied tariff rates for wheat in these countries are below 3%, they are relatively high in the UK (23%) and India (72%) and are subject to a country-specific quota and markup pricing rules in Japan.
As illustrated in Figure 2, tariff rates on consumer-oriented products are generally higher across mostcountries. US poultry exports face a near 100% tariff in India, 40% in Malaysia, 38% in Thailand, 33% in the Philippines, 21% in the United Kingdom, and 8% in Indonesia and Japan. For US beef exports, the UK maintains an in-quota tariff of 20% for up to 1,000 MT of high-quality non-hormone-treated beef and only allows US non-hormone-treated beef exports. Under the recently announced trade deal, the UK will eliminate its 20% in-quota tariff and expand the quota level to 13,000 MT. Vietnam applies a 30% tariff on frozen beef and 14%–20% on chilled beef. Relative tariff disadvantages vis-á-vis Australia and New Zealand undercut US beef exports to Vietnam. Under the recently announced US-Vietnam trade deal, Vietnam’s beef tariff will be liberalized, which will provide parity with Vietnam’s trade agreement partners Australia and New Zealand (USDA FAS, 2023). By contrast, tariff rates are lower in the Philippines (10%), Indonesia (5%), and Malaysia (0%).
While the US pursues new bilateral trade deals, less is known about how closely the profile of US agricultural exports lines up with the importing needs of partner countries. Here, we use the trade complementarity indexas a method by which to evaluate US trade complementarity. The trade complementarity index (TCI) measures the extent to which an export supplier’s share of global agricultural exports aligns with a partner country’s import profile. The TCI between exporting country o and importing country d for product k is defined as TCIod =100*[1-E-k|Mkd-Xko|/2], where Mkd is the share of good k in the imports of country d and Xko is the share of good k in the exports of country o. Goods are defined according to the product categories within the USDA’s Bulk, Intermediate, and Consumer-Oriented (BICO) classification of agricultural products. The TCI index approaches zero when goods exported by o are not aligned with products imported by d. The index approaches 100 when the export and import shares of product k match.
Intuitively, the TCI can be thought of as the degree of overlap, or correlation, in d’s reliance on imports of product k and o’s ability or comparative advantage toprovide exports of product k. If o’s comparative advantage products are those in which d relies on imports (comparative disadvantage), the TCI will reflect a higher value, indicating that o and d are a good match for a bilateral trade deal.
Figure 3 plots the 2021–2023 average TCI values for 11 individual trading partners and the median TCI value (shown in red) across all 75 countries in the database. Mexico is also illustrated (in green) because the United States and Mexico have shared one of the longest-standing trade agreements under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994–2019) and the United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) agreement (2019-present). Mexico and South Korea registered the highest TCI value, suggesting that the mix of food and agricultural products they import matches well the shares of these products in US exports.
Vietnam, China, and Japan are also excellent candidates for a trade agreement with the United States, given their relatively high TCI scores of 68.4, 64.8, and 64.1, respectively. The United States lacks a formaltrade agreement with either Vietnam or China, and only a limited trade arrangement with Japan (USJTA), established under the first Trump administration. Moving along the horizontal axis, we can see that current US trade deal announcements with Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia are all above the median importing country in the sample.
The TCI analysis confirms that most announced bilateral partners represent strategically important opportunities for US agriculture. With TCI scores consistently above the global median, these markets demonstrate strong alignment between their import needs and US export capabilities. However, realizing the projected $6.6 billion in additional exports (Table 1) will require continued effort in trade negotiations, attention to implementation and timeframes, and proactive liberalization of each country’s non-tariff restrictions. Success in these bilateral agreements could provide a critical diversification channel for US agricultural exports amidst a more uncertain trade relationship with China.
The United States’ pursuit of new bilateral frameworks
marks a strategic pivot toward diversification in agricultural export markets amid a shifting and unpredictable trade relationship with China. While details remain limited, preliminary evidence compiled from various media articles suggests that these agreements—particularly with Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines—could expand US agricultural exports by an estimated $6.6 billion annually, led by stronger demand for grains, oilseeds, and biofuels. The trade complementarity analysis confirms that most new partners exhibit strong alignment between their import needs and US comparative advantage, underscoring a strong economic rationale for these trade deals. However, realizing this trade potential will depend on implementation timeframes, the depth of tariff and non-tariff barrier trade concessions, and the extent to which income growth in partner countries supports rising demand for higher-quality, protein-rich foods.
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