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What was initially brushed off as an anomaly soon became a concerning situation. At the beginning of Spring 2024, dairy farmers across several US states noticed an unusual decline in milk production without complete certainty as to the cause (Ly, 2024). A few weeks later, in April, the news broke: Multiple dairy herds in Texas, New Mexico, Idaho, Ohio, Kansas, Michigan, and North Carolina had been diagnosed with avian flu—a similar strain that wreaked havoc on bird populations worldwide in 2022 (Neumann and Kawaoka, 2024). The recent detection of avian influenza type A(H5N1) in dairy cattle marks a worrying development that warrants careful monitoring.
Traditionally, avian influenza (avian flu) has primarily affected birds, but recent strains have demonstrated the ability to infect cattle, raising concerns about the potential for a national and international widespread infection (Caserta et al., 2024). The outbreak has continued to spread to other states, recently reaching California, South Dakota, and Wyoming. This evolving situation necessitates heightened vigilance and robust biosecurity measures to manage and mitigate the virus’ impact on the dairy industry and potential spread to humans (Silva del Rio et al., 2024). As of February 10, 2025, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has confirmed 968 herd outbreaks across 16 states (CDC, 2025).
Highly pathogenic avian flu strains like A(H5N1) and A(H5N2) have historically impacted birds, posing significant risks to animal and public health (Zamani, Bittmann, and Ortega, 2024). In the United States, the first outbreak occurred in 1983–1984, primarily affecting poultry, with no reported human infections (Lupiani and Reddi, 2009). The 2015 outbreak—driven by the A(H5N2) strain—led to the culling of over 50 million birds across 21 states (Zhao et al., 2019), costing US turkeyproducers about $225 million (Çakır, Boland, and Wang, 2018).
The recent 2022–2023 outbreak involved the A(H5N1) strain, resulting in 1,172 outbreaks across 48 states, affecting commercial poultry farms (46 million laying hens, 10 million turkeys, and 3 million broiler chickens) (USDA-APHIS, 2024a). The pattern of this outbreak aligns with known migratory bird routes and the density of poultry-farming operations, highlighting regional disparities, with Minnesota (172 outbreak sites) and South Dakota among the hardest-hit states (CDC, 2023). However, only one human case was reported, in Colorado, linked to occupational exposure during poultry-culling operations, with no sustained human-to-human transmission detected (WHO, 2024).
Hinsz (2023) highlights the common misconception that avian flu can be transmitted through properly handled and cooked poultry, which influenced consumer purchasing decisions. The economic impact of this belief extended beyond poultry, affecting price premiums for differentiated egg products like organic and vegetarian-fed eggs (Zamani, Bittmann, and Ortega, 2024). Further, similar misconceptions have affected the dairy industry in regard to safety of consuming pasteurized milk (FDA, 2024a) and meat products (USDA-APHIS, 2024c) that have undergone FDA and USDA inspection processes. Evidence-based data from both the FDA and USDA confirm that the processing standards effectively eliminate any risk of H5N1 transmission, ensuring the safety of both products for consumers (FDA, 2024a; USDA-APHIS, 2024c).
In March 2024, avian flu A(H5N1) was detected in a Texas dairy herd, making it the first known transmission to cattle in the United States (Silva del Rio et al., 2024). Figure 1 displays the spread of avian flu in dairy cattle from March to February 2025, showing a total of 968 outbreaks. The most significant spread occurred in October–December, with California being the hardest-hit state.
While not fully understood, initial spillover of the virus to cattle may have occurred through the transmission of influenza A(H5N1) to cattle through indirect contact with contaminated environments, such as water sources or surfaces exposed to infected bird droppings (WHO, 2024). Wild migratory waterfowl—natural reservoirs of the virus—may also contribute to its spread (Caserta et al., 2024). Once infected, cattle can spread the flu through the air and possibly also through their milk (FDA, 2024b). However, cattle are less effective than birds at spreading the virus, indicating a less progressive dissemination of the virus through bovine-to-bovine transmission (Neumann and Kawaoka, 2024).
The United States responded swiftly to address this emerging virus outbreak, with the USDA mandating nationwide testing and reporting protocols for interstatemovement of lactating dairy cattle, recommending the implementation of enhanced biosecurity measures, including specific mandates for quarantine and movement restrictions (USDA-APHIS, 2024c; FDA, 2024a). Affected farmers have received financial support to implement these protocols (USDA, 2024a). California is enforcing stricter controls on cattle imports to safeguard its dairy industry and provides additional biosecurity equipment to farmers (CDFA, 2024; Office of Governor Gavin Newson, 2024). Last, the USDA launched a national testing initiative before cattle interstate movement to identify outbreaks in its earliest stages and reassure consumers (McNeil, 2024).
International trade partners like Canada and Mexico introduced additional testing and quarantine requirements for US cattle imports to prevent the spread of A(H5N1) into their herds (AVMA, 2024; Garrison, 2024; Global Ag Media, 2024). The US dairy industry, which relies heavily on exports to maintain profitability, could face substantial economic losses if these restrictions persist or are expanded. Such trade restrictions (extended quarantine and testing requirements) could slow down the supply chain, increase export costs, and reduce competitiveness in the international market (Muhammad and Kilmer, 2008). Additionally, reduced demand from key trade partners due to biosecurity concerns could lead to a surplus in domestic markets, depressing prices and exacerbating challenges for US dairy farmers already dealing with tight margins and rising production costs (Peña-Lévano, Burney, and Beaudry, 2023; Wolf, 2024).
Clinical manifestations of avian flu in dairy cattle have varied across reported cases, including respiratory distress, fever, decreased feed intake, a marked reduction in milk production—of major concern for dairy farmers—and abnormal milk appearance, which may include a thick, yellowish milk (USDA-ARS, 2024; AVMA, 2024). Few cattle have shown severe symptoms, and most cattle are believed to remain asymptomatic (USDA, 2024b; WHO, 2024). The number of cows infected with A(H5N1) that die—known as mortality—has remained low, around 2%, much lower than has been observed in infected birds, where mortality is reported to be above 90% (ACVP, 2012). In contrast, most affected cattle with A(H5N1) recover with appropriate supportive care (WHO, 2024).
The presence of the virus in milk—even in the absence of symptoms—has raised significant food safety concerns. Initial findings suggested the possibility of viral transmission through milk to human populations through the food chain, leading to public alarm (Caserta et al., 2024; FDA, 2024b; NIH, 2024; Rust, 2024). However, subsequent studies confirmed that standard pasteurization effectively neutralizes the virus, ensuring that milk and dairy products are safe for consumption (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2024; Silva del Rio et al., 2024). According to the FDA (2024b), raw (unpasteurized) milk poses a risk for A(H5N1) infection and is a potential source for various other pathogens that could be transmitted through milk, leading the FDA to discourage the consumption of raw milk.
Although food products properly inspected by the FDA and USDA arriving at consumers’ tables are safe from A(H5N1), the virus may have long-term implications for the dairy industry, including potentially reduced productivity in dairy cattle and impacts on animal health, for which more research is needed to better understand and evaluate potential impacts.
The FDA (2024a) has emphasized the importance of maintaining high safety standards, particularly inhandling and processing milk from herds affected by the outbreak. As a precaution, milk from infected cattle is largely diverted from the commercial supply chain until thoroughly treated and tested (WHO, 2024). This practice ensures consumer safety and helps maintain public confidence in dairy products during outbreaks.
Concerns about the safety of meat products from affected cattle have been addressed through extensive testing on ground beef samples by the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FDA, 2024b). Using advanced polymerase chain reaction techniques, the US Food Safety and Inspection Office (FSIS) has consistently found no evidence of the virus in these samples (AVMA, 2024). This means that despite viral particles presence in infected cattle, these fragments do not necessarily represent a viable threat to human health (WHO, 2024).
There are two potential economic implications to the outbreak: negative perception of dairy products, which can be reflected in prices, and production costs due to sick animals and loss of productivity.
Concerning consumer perception, Figure 2 shows the average retail price for whole and 2% reduced-fat conventional and organic milk. Despite the first confirmed A(H5N1) cases in early spring, there is no noticeable decrease in the retail prices of these four milk products. This shows a different market dynamic in milk prices compared to previous avian flu outbreaks in poultry prices (Çakır, Boland, and Wang, 2018). This may suggest effective response to consumer concerns regarding the safety of dairy products by industry, academia, and extension.
The second concern is on supply disruptions, which include the cost of caring for sick animals, reduced milk production, stringent biosecurity measures, and the potential culling of infected cattle (Moya et al., 2020; FDA, 2024a). Resulting financial strains may lead to fluctuations in the dairy supply, market prices, and availability of products for consumers. To ameliorate these possible effects, the USDA has introduced financial aids for producers affected by A(H5N1) to enhance on-site biosecurity and compensate for lost milk production (Abbot, 2024; USDA, 2024b). Further, additional funding is available to facilitate biosecurity measures and viral testing for producers whose herds have not tested positive for A(H5N1) (USDA, 2024b).
As mentioned, broader implications extend to potential disruptions in the international trade of dairy products. For instance, countries importing milk and cheese from the United States (Canada and Mexico) may impose additional restrictions, further threatening the financial stability of US dairy farmers (Nganje, Steinbach, and Yildirim, 2024; CDC, 2024a).
As highlighted above, avian flu may pose an economic burden for dairy farmers. Due to its sudden emergence, no prior research offers guidance for milk producers on the cost that this outbreak may represent for the dairy operation. This section presents an exploratory analysis focused on production loss (in $) due to the required quarantine period. Table 1 outlines the key assumptions and variables in our analysis.
Our analysis assumes that a cow produces an average of 70 lb of milk daily (Johnston and DeVries, 2018). According to biosecurity protocols, a cow infected with avian influenza must be quarantined for 30 days. After the initial 30-day quarantine, the milk is retested. If theresult is negative, the cow is reinserted into the herd, but if it is positive, the quarantine is extended for another 30days (Greene, 2023). Recent research suggests that milk disposal is only needed if a cow develops mastitis symptoms within the first 10 days of quarantine, withmost infected cows recovering afterward (Petersen, 2024;Diaz, 2024). We assume that all standardproduction and animal husbandry practices continue during this period, as farmers must keep feeding and milking infected cows to prevent other health issues such as mastitis (CDFA, 2024). Since there has been no significant drop in dairy milk prices following the first human case of avian flu (April 1, 2024), we assume that prices remain stable (as shown in Figure 2) and thusfocus our analysis on supply-side losses.
We assume that avian flu affects all dairy cattle breeds similarly, although individual variations in symptomresponse may occur (AVMA, 2024). For this cost analysis, we assume, based on WHO (2024), that an ill dairy cow will recover with proper supportive care, including medication and antibiotics that based on practical evidence range between $6 and $70 per cow. For this analysis we assume a treatment cost of $30 percow. Additionally, we have assumed a labor time reallocation of approximately 30 minutes per cow for attending to and medicating the infected animals considering a $15 hourly wage (USDA-ERS, 2025).
Based on these assumptions, Table 2 presents avian flu’s estimated economic impact on an average dairy farm. If a single cow tests positive for avian flu and is removed from the herd for 30 days, production is disposed for 10 days, production losses could reach approximately $198.5 (column 5). If this virus spreads, for example, 5, 10, or 25 cows test positive, total losses would amount to $992.5, $1,985, and $4,962.5, respectively (column 5). These estimates align with the $100–$200 range calculated by the American Association of Bovine Practitioners (Hossain et al., 2024).
On average, dairy farms generate a profit ranging from $985 to a loss of −$1,303 per cow (Penn State Extension, 2022). Therefore, potential avian flu-related losses could significantly reduce profits by $198.5 per cow and even exacerbate existing losses, provoking financial stress among dairy operations.
The 2024–2025 outbreak underscores the importance of early detection and rapid response to limit the virus’s spread, especially in dairy producing states. Comprehensive and practical enhanced safety measures (biosecurity measures) are essential, including regular monitoring and testing of cows showing symptoms, quarantine, sanitation, and controlled access (Wagoner, 2024). Figure 3 outlines biosecurity measures designed to assist dairy farmers in preventing and responding to an avian flu outbreak. The prevention path is depicted as a sequence of proactive measures to minimize the risk of avian flu introduction into a dairy operation. Regular testing emphasizes frequent monitoring and testing of cattle, particularly new arrivals, to detect any early signs of infection. Quarantining new arrivals ensures that any cattle introduced to the herd are temporarily isolated to prevent potential spread. Sanitation and disinfection highlight the critical role of rigorous cleaning practices in eliminating the virus from equipment, vehicles, and facilities, thus reducing the likelihood of surface-based transmission. Controlling access and movement stresses limiting farm access and monitoring personnel movement to prevent the introduction of the virus from external sources.
Vaccines are considered an important measure to help with prevention of infections in a herd. A(H5N1) vaccines have not yet been used in dairy and beef cattle in the United States, but influenza vaccines have proved effective in commercial pigs and poultry, and research efforts evaluating vaccines for A(H5N1) strain for cattle are currently ongoing (Reardon, 2024; USDA-APHIS, 2024b).
The response path involves key actions once an infection is suspected or confirmed. Symptom detection emphasizes promptly identifying signs of avian flu in cattle, such as respiratory issues or reduced milk production. If symptoms or positive test results are found, the infected cattle will be isolated for 30 days to prevent the virus from spreading. Reporting to authorities is crucial for tracking the outbreak and receiving support. Activated enhanced biosecurity, including stricter sanitation and movement restrictions, should be implemented.
Handling infected milk remains essential to managing the avian flu outbreak in dairy farms. Crossley et al. (2024) recently provided experimental evidence supporting milk acidification as a biosecurity intervention, demonstrating that citric acid treatment can successfully inactivate H5N1 in contaminated milk. This intervention could complement existing biosecurity protocols, particularly for farms that do not have immediate access to pasteurization facilities.
The ongoing outbreak has underscored the significant risks faced by farm workers. The first reported human case occurred in Texas on April 1, 2024, involving a dairy farm worker who contracted A(H5N1) after direct contact with infected cattle. The worker exhibited mild symptoms, primarily conjunctivitis, and recovered without complications (CDC, 2024a). In May 2024, two additional cases were reported in Michigan involving farm workers at separate dairy farms (MDHH, 2024a; MDHH, 2024b). Notably, one of these cases initially
tested negative on a nasal swab, but an eye swab sent to the CDC later confirmed the presence of A(H5N1)
(CDC, 2024b). This case may highlight the risks associated with indirect exposure, as the worker is suspected of becoming ill through contact with contaminated surfaces (CDC, 2024b). The fourth case emerged in Colorado in July 2024, where a farm worker experienced mild symptoms, including fatigue and conjunctivitis, after working with infected cattle (FPC, 2024; CDC, 2024b). As of February 2025, the total number of human cases linked to exposure in commercial cattle operations has risen to 41. The majority of affected individuals experienced mild symptoms that resolved without requiring hospitalization (CDC, 2025).
Farm workers play a critical role in biosecurity, serving as the first line of defense against outbreaks. Training programs must emphasize early detection, properly handling contaminated materials such as nonsalable milk, and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) (Neumann and Kawaoka, 2024). Continuous education ensures that workers remain updated on the latest biosecurity practices and prepared to respond effectively to potential outbreaks. For instance, in states like Texas, Michigan, and Colorado, adherence to PPE and safety protocols has been vital in preventing the spread of A(H5N1) among workers (USDA-APHIS, 2024c).
In addition to these measures, it is also recommended that farm workers regularly exposed to (potentially) infected birds and cattle receive the seasonal flu vaccine (CDC, 2024a). Although the vaccine does not protect against the A(H5N1) virus, vaccinating at least 2 weeks before exposure can reduce the incidence and severity of the seasonal flu and lower the risk of a coinfection with the avian virus (Caserta et al., 2024).
The success of managing the avian flu outbreak in the US dairy industry hinges on maintaining public confidence in dairy product safety and ensuring robust government support (Neumann and Kawaoka, 2024). Transparent communication and effective government policies are critical, and this could explain the stability of milk prices shown in a previous section. Publicizing rigorous safety standards, such as the diversion of milk from infected cattle and stringent testing protocols, helps maintain consumer confidence (FDA, 2024a).
Government support is vital, with the USDA providing financial aid to farmers (USDA, 2024b; USDA-APHIS, 2024c) and policy initiatives to enhance biosecurity technologies and establish emergency funds or insurance schemes for zoonotic diseases. Ongoing research and development efforts are necessary to improve the detection, management, and prevention of avian flu in dairy cattle. (Neumann and Kawaoka, 2024).
The 2024–2025 avian flu A(H5N1) outbreak in the US dairy industry represents a critical juncture for the agricultural sector and public health. This outbreak has demonstrated the significant risks that zoonotic diseases pose to livestock, the economy, and the food supply chain. As the outbreak evolves, the lessons learned and measures implemented must be used to outline blueprint for continuing efforts to increase the safety and security of food chains against potential future infectious disease outbreaks.
For those dairies whose herds exhibit symptoms, on average, about 10%–20% of each affected herd appears to be impacted, with little to no associated mortality reported (USDA-APHIS, 2024c). Thus, farmers play a crucial role in this, as they can detect and remove infected cows early by monitoring for signs of infection. Likewise, the findings of this study on the economic impact of avian flu on an average dairy farm highlight the urgent need for proactive management strategies to prevent or mitigate infestation risks.
A key takeaway from this situation is the critical importance of rigorous biosecurity measures. Acting quickly and following safety measures helped stop the virus from spreading. Government support, in the form of financial aid and policy initiatives, has also played a vital role in mitigating the immediate economic impact and potentially aid in building long-term resilience within the industry (Ly, 2024). Maintaining public confidence through transparent communication and stringent food safety standards has been equally essential in ensuring consumer trust in dairy products during this challenging time.
However, the fight against avian flu does not end with these immediate responses. Continuous research is paramount to advancing our understanding of the virus’s transmission patterns, updating treatment protocols, and improving biosecurity technologies. The economic impact of the outbreak, particularly on dairy farms and related industries, warrants further investigation. A detailed economic analysis, similar to those conducted after previous poultry outbreaks (Moya et al., 2020; Hinsz, 2023), can provide valuable insights into market dynamics, consumer behavior, and the long-term financial stability of the dairy sector.
In summary, while the 2024–2025 avian flu outbreak has tested the resilience of the US dairy industry, it has also underscored the importance of preparedness, innovation, and collaboration among government, research, and industry. The ongoing efforts to combat this virus will not only safeguard the current agricultural landscape but also lay the foundation for a more robust and resilient food system in the future.
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