CHOICES
A publication of AAEA
Tariffs have returned to the center of US economic policy (Grant, Arita, and Karagülle, 2025). Since taking office, the second Trump administration has imposed wide-ranging duties on imported goods, including many food products (Luckstead and Devadoss, 2025). Fruits and vegetables are especially susceptible to price inflation due to tariffs (Luckstead and Devadoss, 2025; Naing Naing, Devadoss, and He, 2026). In 2024, imports from Mexico accounted for 69% of fresh vegetables in the US, and 20% were sourced from Canada (He, Naing Naing, and Devadoss, 2026). Tariffs of up to 25% on products from Mexico and Canada are anticipated to take effect after the 2026 review of the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and import quantities of fresh vegetables are expected to decline by 15%–36% (He, Naing Naing and Devadoss, 2026). More immediately, trade tensions have resulted in declining US imports of frozen beef from Brazil and New Zealand (Muhammad, Martinez and Wyatt, 2026). In response, the White House (2025) issued an executive order in November 2025 exempting items such as beef, coffee, and chocolate from the tariffs. Nevertheless, many food products continue to be affected by the tariffs, and retaliatory measures from China disrupted the US soybean market in 2025 (Colussi and Langemeier, 2025). Economists broadly agree on the basic mechanics of trade policy: Tariffs raise domestic prices, and much of the cost is borne by consumers. Yet tariffs remain politically durable (even popular!), despite visible increases in grocery bills. This persistence poses a puzzle. If tariffs make everyday goods more expensive, why do so many Americans continue to support them?
Part of the answer may lie not in economics but in belief (Davidson and Schaefer, 2025). Public debates over tariffs are framed less in terms of welfare losses and more in terms of fairness, national strength, and protection of American workers. Tariffs are described as tools to “level the playing field,” “bring jobs home,” or “stand up to unfair trade” (Burkhart and Hammond, 2026). In these narratives, higher prices are not couched as a policy failure but rather as a patriotic sacrifice.
Economists have devoted considerable attention to measuring the incidence and efficiency costs of tariffs (Aguiar and Devadoss, 2025; Livingston, Schaefer and Malone, 2025; Raul, Ogunsowo and Schaefer, 2025), but far less is known about how consumers themselves understand what tariffs are for, what they symbolize, and whether the costs they impose are viewed as worth bearing (Grossman and Helpman, 2021). Previous research notes stark differences between layperson and economist beliefs about markets and trade (Boyer and Petersen, 2018; Bhattacharjee and Dana, 2024). Generally, the public holds “folk-economist beliefs” that view international trade as net negative and thus favor protectionist policies (Boyer and Petersen, 2018). According to Caplan (2001), beliefs are not necessarily driven by political ideology, but education is correlated with the tendency to think like an economist. In the food policy space, voters also tend to prefer increased government intervention regardless of political affiliation (Biedny, Malone and Lusk, 2020).
Despite known differences in economic beliefs and food policy preferences, no study to date has specifically examined how Americans perceive tariffs on food imports. Using a nationally representative survey, we measure beliefs across three dimensions: the perceived purpose of tariffs, their symbolic meaning, and respondents’ willingness to bear higher prices in pursuit of tariff goals.
We first document what Americans believe, on average, about a set of popular tariff narratives (e.g., protecting jobs, responding to unfair trade, or demonstrating national strength). We then show how these beliefs differ across political identity, gender, and familiarity with economics.
Our analysis suggests that public support for tariffs is driven less by expectations about prices and more by values and narratives. Americans often recognize that tariffs raise costs yet still endorse them as justified, patriotic, or necessary. Political identity is the dominant organizing force, but even respondents with greater economic familiarity frequently express normative support for tariffs.
Our analysis draws on a nationally representative online survey of US adults fielded in August 2025. Respondents were recruited through Prolific using demographic quotas for age, gender, race and ethnicity, and region based on the 2023 American Community Survey (US Census Bureau, 2023). An additional quota ensured balanced representation across political affiliation (Democrat, Independent, and Republican). All respondents were at least 18 years old. The survey took approximately 8 minutes to complete, and participants were compensated for their time. After excluding respondents who did not identify as the primary grocery shopper in their household, the final analytic sample consists of 1,170 individuals.
The full survey included both a dichotomous choice experiment and a post-survey questionnaire measuring beliefs about tariffs, trade policy, and food prices. Results of the dichotomous choice experiment are reported in Davidson and Schaefer (2025). The present article uses only the belief questions and associated demographic information. In addition to political affiliation and gender, the survey elicited respondents’ familiarity with economics and trade policy. We classify respondents into low, medium, and high economics familiarity based on self-reported exposure and understanding. We categorize respondents who reported having no formal training in economics as “low” familiarity (261 respondents); we categorize respondents who had at least one economics course in college or high school as “medium” familiarity (818 respondents); and we categorize respondents who received either an undergraduate or graduate degree in economics as “high” familiarity (91 respondents). This allows us to examine whether tariff beliefs primarily reflect ideological identity or whether they vary systematically with economic training.
Respondents evaluated the statements about tariffs using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) (see Table 1). These statements were designed to capture three distinct dimensions of how Americans think about tariffs on food imports:
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we document what Americans believe about tariffs on average. We present sample means and confidence intervals for each belief domain. We then examine heterogeneity in these beliefs across key characteristics. For each Likert-scale outcome, we estimate ordered logit models that relate agreement with each statement to political affiliation, gender, and economics familiarity.
Figure 1 summarizes how Americans evaluate a set of common tariff narratives. Each bar reports the percentage distribution of responses to the indicated statement on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Bars sum to 100% within each statement. Figure 1(a) groups statements describing the justification and purpose of tariffs; Figure 1(b) groups statements describing the symbolic meaning of tariffs; and Figure 1(c) groups statements describing respondents’ willingness to bear higher prices in pursuit of tariff-related goals.
Figure 1(a) reports beliefs about the justification and purpose of tariffs. On average, Americans are skeptical of most pro-tariff narratives. Mean agreement is below the neutral midpoint for claims that tariffs protect jobs (2.47), reduce illegal immigration and fentanyl trafficking (1.98), and are broadly justified (2.54). Respondents are somewhat more receptive to the idea that tariffs demonstrate national strength in international negotiations (2.58) but still fall short of endorsement. The one clear exception is the “unfair trade” frame:Americans, on average, agree that tariffs are an effective way to respond to other countries’ unfair trade practices, with a mean of 3.04.
Figure 1(b) turns to the symbolic meaning of tariffs. Here, the contrast is stark. Americans do not, on average, view tariffs as “economic patriotism” (mean = 2.28). Instead, they are far more likely to agree that tariffs constitute “economic warfare,” with a mean of 3.88. This suggests that many consumers interpret tariffs less as expressions of national pride and more as instruments of conflict. Tariffs are widely understood to be adversarial in nature, even among those who may still support their use.
Figure 1(c) examines willingness to bear the costs of tariffs. Respondents generally reject the idea that consumers should pay higher prices to support domestic industries (mean = 2.42). At the same time, they are closer to neutral on whether “paying more for goods made in the US is worth it,” with a mean of 2.73. This pattern suggests an interesting tension: Americans are reluctant to endorse higher prices in the abstract, yet many remain open to the notion that higher costs might be justified under certain circumstances.
Of course, the averages in Figure 1 may conceal profound differences in how Americans interpret tariffs. To identify which characteristics organize these beliefs, we estimate ordered logit models for each statement, relating agreement to political affiliation, gender, and economics familiarity. The results are reported in Appendix Table A1. Three patterns emerge clearly.
Political affiliation is by far the dominant predictor of tariff beliefs. Across every pro-tariff frame, Republicans are substantially more likely to agree, while Democrats are substantially less likely to agree, relative to political Independents. The magnitudes are large and remarkably stable across outcomes. For example, Republicans score higher than Independents on the claim that tariffs are justified, while Democrats score lower. Similar gaps appear for protecting jobs, responding to unfair trade, and endorsing higher prices.
The one exception is especially revealing. For the statement that “tariffs are a form of economic warfare,” the partisan pattern reverses: Democrats are significantly more likely to agree, while Republicans are slightly less likely to do so. In other words, the same policy instrument is interpreted by one group as a tool of patriotism and by another as an act of conflict.
These results indicate that tariff beliefs are not loosely held opinions but are embedded in broader partisan worldviews. Party identity structures not only whether tariffs are supported but what they are understood to represent.
Figure 2 further illustrates the joint role of political identity and economic familiarity. Within each familiarity group, the distribution of responses differs sharply by political affiliation. Republicans are concentrated in higher agreement categories, and non-Republicans are concentrated in lower categories. Greater familiarity with economics modestly shifts responses within groups. However, it does not eliminate these differences. This reinforces the central role of political identity in structuring tariff beliefs.
Gender differences are present but modest. Women are somewhat more likely to agree that tariffs protect jobs, reduce illegal immigration and fentanyl trade, and reflect economic patriotism. At the same time, women are significantly less likely to view tariffs as economic warfare. These effects are statistically meaningful in several cases, but they are small relative to the partisan divides. In other words, gender may shape how tariffs are interpreted at the margins, but it does not reorganize the belief landscape.
Beliefs also vary with self-reported familiarity with economics. Respondents with high economics familiarity are more likely to agree that tariffs are justified, protect jobs, deter illegal activity, and reflect economic patriotism. They are also more willing to endorse higher consumer prices. These patterns complicate the common assumption that tariff support reflects economic misunderstanding. Greater familiarity does not uniformly erode support; in several domains, it strengthens it.
At the same time, economics familiarity does not override political identity. Even among highly familiar respondents, partisan gaps remain large and statistically significant. Knowledge shapes beliefs, but it does not dissolve the underlying ideological structure.
Our results help explain why tariffs remain politically resilient even when their costs are visible. Americans are not simply misinformed about price effects. Many recognize that tariffs raise costs and carry adversarial consequences yet continue to evaluate them through moral and symbolic frames. For a substantial share of the public, tariffs are not primarily economic instruments; they are statements about fairness, strength, and national identity. As a result, higher grocery prices are often interpreted not as policy failure but as evidence of resolve. As our results show consumer perceptions about tariffs are largely driven by political ideology, we anticipate these sentiments to persist, at least in the near future. Political parties in the US are increasinglysegregated ideologically (Biedny, Malone and Lusk, 2020; Oberlander, 2024), and tariffs have become a major point of this political division.
This has important implications for trade policy and communication. Economic arguments alone are unlikely to move public opinion in a meaningful way. The belief patterns documented here suggest that persuasion depends less on demonstrating who pays and more on contesting the narratives that justify those payments. Frames centered on “unfair trade” are uniquely persuasive across the population. Claims tied to immigration and illicit activity resonate with narrower audiences. Conversely, the widespread perception of tariffs as “economic warfare” suggests that many Americans already understand trade policy in adversarial terms. Policymakers who wish to build or temper support for tariffs must therefore engage not only with prices and employment but also with the values and identities that tariffs are seen to embody.
The results also caution against assuming that increased economic training will naturally erode support for trade barriers. Respondents with higher economics familiarity often express stronger normative endorsement of tariffs, particularly when they are framed as tools for protection or national purpose. Knowledge informs beliefs, but it does not dissolve the underlying ideological structure. Political identity remains the primary lens through which tariffs are understood.
For the food and agriculture industry, our study indicates consumer apathy toward rising grocery prices, and potentially even retaliatory measures. Future research should explore public sentiments toward retaliatory trade policy used as economic warfare (e.g. China’s ban on soybean imports). If US trade policy increasingly supports protectionist policies, we will observe significant shifts in trade flows of food and agricultural products which will be detrimental to the industry (Luckstead and Devadoss, 2025).
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